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THE FELONY MURDER RULE IN ILLINOIS:
THE INJUSTICE OF THE PROXIMATE
CAUSE THEORY EXPLORED VIA
RESEARCH IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
MARTIN LIJTMAER*
The felony murder rule has long been the subject of intense criticism by the
legal scholar community. Illinois abides by the proximate cause theory of
the felony murder rule. The proximate cause theory holds felons
accountable for any foreseeable deaths that occur during the commission
or attempted commission of a felony. This includes deaths of innocent
bystanders caused by third parties, and even, as in two recently decided
Illinois Supreme Court cases, the deaths of co-felons at the hands of police
officers. Illinois courts have justified using proximate cause, a concept
borrowed from tort law, on the grounds that the foreseeability requirement
would temper the innate harshness of the felony murder rule. However, in
practice, instead of placing a restriction on the felony murder rule, it has
been applied expansively, extending liability even to those defendants
whose actions appeared attenuated from their co-felon's death. This
Comment explores why the proximate cause theory has failed in its
purported purpose to limit the felony murder rule, and employs cognitive
psychology as a means to explain the rule's expansive application.
* Juris Doctor 2008, Northwestern University School of Law. I am tremendously
thankful to Professor Dorothy Roberts for her invaluable insight and guidance without which
this Comment would be in shambles today. Similarly, I am grateful to Professor Janice
Nadler for exposing me to the field of law and psychology which prompted my idea for this
Comment in the first place. The editorial staff of the Journal of Criminal Law and
Criminology also deserves a hefty thank you for their work and patience. Finally, and most
importantly, I can never say enough thanks to my family: Hugo, Ruth, and Fabian.
MARTIN LIJTMAER
I. INTRODUCTION
In the summer of 2006, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed two first-
degree murder convictions in People v. Hudson' and People v.
Klebanowski.2 Both cases involved eerily similar fact patterns where an
off-duty police officer, unbeknownst to the perpetrators, happened to be a
target of an armed robbery.3 In both cases, the officer fatally shot one of
the felons, and the defendant was convicted of first-degree murder for the
death of his accomplice.4 The Illinois Supreme Court upheld both
convictions under the felony murder rule and reaffirmed its allegiance to the
proximate cause theory of felony murder.5
The proximate cause theory holds felons accountable for any
foreseeable deaths that occur during the commission or attempted
commission of a felony.6 This includes deaths of innocent bystanders
caused by third parties, and even, as in Hudson and Klebanowski, deaths of
co-felons at the hands of police officers.7 Illinois courts have justified using
proximate cause, a concept borrowed from tort law, on the grounds that the
foreseeability requirement would temper the innate harshness of the felony
murder rule. 8 However, in practice, instead of placing a restriction on the
felony murder rule, it has been applied expansively, extending liability even
to those defendants whose actions were attenuated from their co-felon's
death. This Comment explores why the proximate cause theory has failed
in its purported purpose to limit the felony murder rule and suggests that
research in cognitive psychology can help us understand the rule's
expansive application.
Psychologists have long been aware of universal biases, such as the
hindsight bias, the phenomenon that people overestimate the predictability
of past events, 9 and the outcome bias, the tendency to judge the quality of a
decision based on its consequences.1° Research suggests that these two
biases, working in tandem, considerably undermine people's ability to
1 856 N.E.2d 1078 (Ill. 2006).




6 Kara M. Houck, People v. Dekens: The Expansion of the Felony-Murder Doctrine in
Illinois, 30 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 357, 367 (1999).
7 Id. at 358-59.
8 See People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (Ill. 2006).
9 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, A Positive Psychological Theory of Judging in Hindsight, 65 U.
CHI. L. REv. 571, 571 (1998).
10 Philip G. Peters, Jr., Hindsight Bias and Tort Liability: Avoiding Premature
Conclusions, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1277, 1282 (1999).
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judge the foreseeability of events in hindsight accurately' '-a task required
of juries and judges in determining the guilt of felony murder defendants
via the proximate cause theory.' 2 Furthermore, studies in causal attribution
have shown that people conflate blameworthy behavior with causation.13
For example, research shows that people assessing causation for a traffic
accident placed more blame on a driver whose motive for speeding was to
hide a vial of cocaine than on a driver rushing to hide an anniversary
present. 14 Furthermore, another study suggests that blame is attributed in
proportion to the severity of the result-thus the more severe the result, the
more blame that will be attributed to the actor.
15
The implications of this research for the proximate cause theory of the
felony murder rule are twofold. First, by virtue of these psychological
phenomena, both juries and judges tend to find that a resulting death was
foreseeable in felony murder cases, even where there were superseding
intervening causes breaking the causal connection between the defendant's
conduct and the resulting death. Furthermore, due to the inherently
blameworthy behavior entailed in committing a felony, causal attributions
are exacerbated leading to unwarranted causal associations between the
defendant's acts and the resulting death. As such, the research suggests that
in individual cases, the playing field is heavily tilted against the felony
murder defendant.
Second, and on a broader level, the expansion of proximate cause
theory jurisprudence since its inception is a direct result of the outcomes of
individual felony murder cases. Because juries are likely to find a resulting
death foreseeable and appellate judges are generally deferential to jury
determinations, courts have upheld felony murder convictions, gradually
expanding the application of the proximate cause theory of the felony
murder rule. In other words, the effects of the hindsight bias, outcome bias,
and causal attribution on individual cases has translated into a general
expansion of the Illinois Supreme Court's jurisprudence with respect to its
felony murder rule.
1 Id.
12 Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 579-80 ("The [hindsight] bias is not limited to specific
populations of subjects.... Studies even have demonstrated that the bias influences the
judgments of experts in several different fields. Two studies have shown that even state and
federal judges are susceptible to the bias.").
13 Mark D. Alicke, Culpable Causation, 63 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 368, 368
(1992).
14 Id. at 369.
15 D. Chimaeze Ugwuegbu & Clyde Hendrick, Personal Causality and Attribution of
Responsibility, 2 Soc. BEHAV. & PERSONALITY 76, 76 (1974).
20081
MARTINLIJTMAER
This Comment is organized into three parts. Part II provides general
background information on the felony murder rule and explains how the
rule developed and is applied in Illinois. Hudson and Klebanowski are both
discussed in detail as illustrations of the anomalous consequences resulting
from the modem application of the proximate cause theory of the felony
murder rule. After providing a synopsis of the relevant research on the
hindsight bias, the outcome bias, and causal attribution literature, Part III
analyzes and outlines the implications of these studies. First, I discuss the
implications of the biases on individual cases and show how the research
suggests that the felony murder defendant is placed at an unfair
disadvantage at the hands of jurors and judges alike. Then, I explore the
broader ramification of the research, specifically discussing how causal
attribution research helps to explain why the Illinois legislature adopted
such broad language in its felony murder statute, as well as why the Illinois
Supreme Court's jurisprudence has been characterized by constant
expansion of the rule. Finally, Part IV consists of general conclusions as
well as a research proposal that would test my assertions regarding
cognitive psychology's implications for the proximate cause theory of the
felony murder rule.
II. THE FELONY MURDER RULE
The felony murder rule has long been the subject of intense criticism
by the legal community. 16 In its traditional form, the felony murder rule
provides that the killing of another human being during the course of a
felony constitutes murder.' 7  Whether the death was intentional or
accidental is irrelevant-the mens rea required for murder is automatically
supplied by the intent to commit the underlying felony.18 At its broadest,
"[t]he rule imposes strict homicidal liability on felons even for deaths
16 See generally Rudolph J. Gerber, The Felony Murder Rule: Conundrum Without
Principle, 31 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 763 (1999) (providing a history of the felony murder rule and its
criticisms); Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony Murder Rule: A Doctrine at
Constitutional Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REv. 446 (1985); James J. Tomkovicz, The
Endurance of the Felony-Murder Rule: A Study of the Forces That Shape Our Criminal Law,
51 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 1429 (1994).
17 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1433.
18 Gerber, supra note 16, at 763; see also Norman J. Finkel, Culpability and
Commonsense Justice: Lessons Learned Betwixt Murder and Madness, 10 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL'Y 11, 19 (1996). Finkel notes that three reasons have been given
justifying the felony murder rule. Id. The least satisfying is that felony murder is a strict
liability offense requiring no mens rea. Id. The second is transferred intent where intent for
the underlying felony substitutes for the mental state required for the homicide. Id. Finally,
"constructive malice" presumes malice for the homicide from the mental state required for
the commission of the underlying felony. Id. Finkel cleverly labels constructive malice
"one size fits all" mens rea. Id.
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caused by third parties such as victims, police, or bystanders." 19  As a
result, the felony murder rule runs afoul of a fundamental principle of our
criminal justice system-the requirement that a guilty mental state specific
to the crime committed be established to attach criminal liability.20 This
dispensing with the mens rea requirement has led scholars and judges to
call it "abhorrent, 21 "anachronistic,,, 22 "barbaric, 23 "injudicious and
unprincipled,, 24 "an unsightly wart on the skin of the criminal law,'
25
"parasitic,' '2 6 and a "modem monstrosity" that "erodes the relationship
between criminal liability and moral culpability.
2 7
Modem courts have justified the existence of the felony murder rule
primarily based on principles of deterrence.2 8 There are two different
"strains" of the deterrence rationale. 29 The more commonly held of the two
is that the threat of a murder conviction will induce felons to take greater
care during the commission of a felony, thus minimizing the chance of
negligent killings. 30  The second view posits that the risk of a murder
conviction for any killing during the commission of a felony will dissuade
potential felons from committing the felony in the first place. 3 1 However,
both of these deterrence rationales have been challenged by scholars.3 2
With regard to accidental killings, scholars question how it is possible
to deter an unintended act. Likewise, they pose the identical question where
a third party, such as a police officer, commits the fatal act. Because the
felon has no control over a third party's acts, scholars dispute how the
felony murder rule can deter this kind of killing. Another problem with the
19 Gerber, supra note 16, at 766-67.
20 See Donald A. Dripps, Fundamental Retribution Error: Criminal Justice and the
Social Psychology of Blame, 56 VAND. L. REv. 1383, 1386 (2003) (stating that "[t]here could
be no crime, said Blackstone, without a 'vicious will' and quoting Morissette v. United
States, 342 U.S. 246 (1956), as saying that "[t]he contention that an injury can amount to a
crime only when inflicted by intention is no provincial or transient notion. It is as universal
and persistent in mature systems of law as belief in freedom of the human will and a
consequent ability and duty of the normal individual to choose between good and evil").
21 Isabel Grant & A. Wayne MacKay, Constructive Murder and the Charter. In Search
of Principle, 25 ALBERTA L. REv. 129, 133, 156-57 (1987).
22 People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 307 (Mich. 1980).
23 David Lanham, Felony Murder-Ancient and Modern, 7 CRIM. L.J. 90, 101 (1983).
24 Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 334.
25 H.L. Packer, Criminal Code Revision, 23 U. TORONTO L.J. 1, 4 (1973).
26 Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 333 n.16.
27 Lanham, supra note 23, at 101.
28 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1448.
29 Roth & Sundby, supra note 16, at 450.
30 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1449.
31 Id.
32 See id.; Gerber, supra note 16; Roth & Sundby, supra note 16.
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deterrence rationales are that they require that those targeted by the rule
know the law-laypeople are likely unaware of the felony murder rule
rendering the deterrence justification moot. Finally, commentators note that
there is no proof that the felony murder rule actually serves its deterrent
purpose.33 The lack of data supporting the deterrence justification has
prompted one commentator to note:
Assertions that the doctrine exists to prevent killings that occur in the course of
felonies and that it actually achieves its goal are rooted in blind faith or self-
delusion .... If the rule is to stand upon deterrent premises, it is incumbent upon
supporters to do more than speculate. They should have to justify the suspension of
our normal insistence upon proof of blameworthiness. Without a credible foundation
in established facts, deterrence is not a real justification, but is instead a poor excuse
for our infidelity.
34
Some courts have also suggested a retributive basis for justifying the
felony murder rule.35 Under this rationale, proponents argue that "a crime
which ends in death should be punished more severely than the same crime
that does not end in death. 36 This justification for the felony murder rule
has its roots in seventeenth- and eighteenth-century England where judges
focused more heavily on the result of a crime rather than the intent of the
perpetrator. 37  Consequently, "a convict.., bore responsibility for his
felony and for any harmful result arising from the crime regardless of his
specific intentions. ' 3  However, application of this theory in the modem
American criminal justice system runs afoul of the established notion of
"just desserts., 39  By considering felony murder a first-degree murder
offense, punishment for an accidental or third-party killing is placed on the
same level as premeditated murder, violating the principle of
proportionality between crime and punishment.40 A felony murder where
the death resulted from negligence or recklessness, under the principle of
proportionality, should not be punished as severely as a premeditated killing
where the culprit had homicidal intent.
Despite such sustained criticism, the felony murder rule has persevered
in almost all jurisdictions; only three states have completely abolished it.
41
33 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1456-57.
34 Id. at 1457.
35 Roth & Sundby, supra note 16, at 450.
36 Donald Baier, Arizona Felony Murder: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 36 ARIz. L.
REv. 701, 710 (1994).
37 Roth & Sundby, supra note 16, at 458.
38 id.
39 Baier, supra note 36, at 710.
40 Id. at 711.
41 Roth & Sundby, supra note 16, at 446 n.6. Kentucky and Hawaii have abolished the
rule by statute. HAW. REv. STAT. §§ 707-701 (1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.020
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Professor James Tomkovicz convincingly analyzes the reasons why the
felony murder rule has endured.42 He suggests that one explanation for its
endurance has been its limiting modifications in most jurisdictions.43 Only
a small minority of states still retain the broadest application of the rule
while the rest have, in one way or another, curtailed the reach of the felony
murder rule. 4 Most states have a restricted form of the felony murder rule
that applies only to felons acting in furtherance of one of a certain, limited,
group of felonies such as armed robbery, sexual assault, and assault with a
deadly weapon.45 Felonies outside of that list, such as selling liquor to a
minor, do not lead to a felony murder conviction, even if multiple deaths
resulted from a drunk-driving related accident. Others jurisdictions, instead
of providing a specific list, generally limit the felony murder rule to felonies
that are "inherently dangerous to human life. ' '46 Another limitation
commonly subscribed to is the "agency theory,, 47 which limits the felony
murder rule to killings caused by the felon or an accomplice, thereby
excluding deaths caused by a third party's intervention.48 An alternate
approach, the proximate cause theory of felony murder, imposes liability on
felons for killings committed by someone other than the felon or co-felon,
but only if those deaths are proximately resulting from the defendant's
unlawful actions.49  While these "modern incarnations" of the felony
murder rule have diminished the extent of the rule's injustice by eliminating
numerous egregious felony murder cases, these limitations have also
contributed to the felony murder rule's longevity: "By keeping it on a leash,
legislatures and courts have prevented it from behaving in ways that could
attract public attention and antipathy."
50
(1975). Michigan has eliminated the rule by judicial decision. People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d
304 (Mich. 1980).
42 See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 16.
43 Id. at 1468; Baier, supra note 36, at 703 (noting that many scholars have called for the
felony murder rule's total abolishment, yet its history in the United States has been one of
limitation).
44 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1467.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 Houck, supra note 6, at 366.
48 James W. Hilliard, Felony Murder in Illinois-The "Agency Theory" vs. the
"Proximate Cause Theory": The Debate Continues, 25 S. ILL. U. L.J. 331, 344 (2001).
49 People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (I11. 1997) (explaining that in Illinois,
liability attaches under the felony murder rule for any death proximately resulting from the
unlawful activity, notwithstanding the fact that the killing was by one resisting the crime);
Hilliard, supra note 48, at 331-32.
50 Tomkovicz, supra note 16, at 1468-69.
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The Illinois legislature has adopted a combination of the above-
mentioned limiting doctrines of felony murder. The statute restricts the
rule's application to "forcible felonies." Under § 2-8 of the Illinois Code,
"Forcible felony" means treason, first degree murder, second degree murder,
predatory criminal sexual assault of a child, aggravated criminal sexual assault,
criminal sexual assault, robbery, burglary, residential burglary, aggravated arson,
arson, aggravated kidnaping, kidnaping, aggravated battery resulting in great bodily
harm or permanent disability or disfigurement and any other felony which involves
the use or threat of physical force or violence against any individual.
Therefore, Illinois includes a specific list of enumerated forcible felonies,
but also provides for a broader, generalized definition of forcible felony.
To determine whether a felony qualifies as "forcible" when applied to the
felony murder rule, the Illinois Supreme court has stated that, "the
test... is not whether the felony is normally classified as non-violent, but is
whether, under the facts of a particular case, it is contemplated that violence
might be necessary to enable the conspirators to carry out their common
purpose. 52
Beyond these general limitations, Illinois also subscribes to the
proximate cause theory of the felony murder rule. 53  Although never
actually codified by the Illinois Legislature, the Illinois Supreme Court
explicitly accepted the proximate cause theory in 1997 by virtue of the
legislature's broad definition of felony murder and based on the
development of its case law.5 4  Generally, felony murder has been
recognized by the Illinois legislature since 1827, but in 1961, the legislature
reconsidered whether the felony murder rule ought to exist. 55 Instead of
curtailing the reach of the rule, the legislature adopted expansive language
in its recodification, relying extensively on the 1934 Illinois Supreme Court
case People v. Payne.56 In Payne, the defendant informed his accomplices
that there was a large sum of money at a particular house. Acting upon that
information, two armed robbers broke into the home, eventually leading to
a gun battle with two brothers who lived there.57 One of the brothers was
killed in the exchange but officials were unable to determine who fired the
51 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/2-8 (2006).
52 People v. Belk, 784 N.E.2d 825, 828-29 (I11. 2003); People v. Golson, 207 N.E.2d 68,
73 (Ill. 1965) (emphasis in original).
53 Hilliard, supra note 48, at 331.
54 Houck, supra note 6, at 370.
55 Id. at 368-69.
56 194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935).
5' id. at 541.
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fatal shot.58 In upholding the defendant's conviction for felony murder, the
Illinois Supreme Court stated:
It reasonably might be anticipated that an attempted robbery would meet with
resistance, during which the victim might be shot either by himself or someone else in
attempting to prevent the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the robbery
would be guilty of murder.... A killing which happens in the prosecution of an
unlawful act which in its consequences naturally tends to destroy the life of a human
being is murder.
59
The Committee specifically referenced Payne in drafting the felony murder
statute, but it employed even broader language than the court in its
commentary to the newly recodified felony murder rule: "It is immaterial
whether the killing in such a case is intentional or accidental, or is
committed by a confederate without the connivance of the defendant.., or
even by a third person trying to prevent the commission of the felony.,'
60
Once the legislature established this broad language for the felony murder
rule, it was left up to courts for interpretation.
Since the 1961 revision of the Illinois Criminal Code, the Illinois
Supreme Court's felony murder jurisprudence has been characterized by
constant expansion. In 1974, the court decided two cases, People v. Allen
61
and People v. Hickman,62 which both applied the felony murder rule to the
situation where one police officer shot and killed another officer while in
pursuit of the perpetrators.63 In affirming the defendants' convictions, the
court specifically cited the commentary to the 1961 revision of the felony
murder rule.64 Under this newly revised felony murder rule, a defendant
may be held liable for the death of a police officer whether the fatal shot
was fired by a co-felon in the furtherance of the attempted robbery or by
another police officer in opposition to the attempted robbery.65 Thus, Allen
and Hickman expanded the felony murder rule to include accidental killings
of police officers responding to a felony, regardless of whether or not the
felon actively participated in the officer's death, or was even armed at the
time.
58 Id. at 543.
59 id.
60 See People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1084-85 (Ill. 2006) (noting that the drafters
of the 1961 criminal code incorporated Payne's holding and included the quoted text in their
commentary).
61 309 N.E.2d 544, 549 (Ill. 1974).
62 319 N.E.2d 511, 513-14. (Ill. 1974).
63 See id.; Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 544.
64 Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 512-13; Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 545.
65 Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 513 (citing Allen, 309 N.E.2d at 549).
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The next expansion of the felony murder rule came over twenty years
later, in People v. Lowery, where the court overturned an intermediate
appellate court decision that interpreted Hickman as expressly limiting third
party liability to police conduct acting in the line of duty.66 The court
rejected the lower court's ruling, and expanded the felony murder rule to
govern other types of third party killings.6 7 In Lowery, the defendant
attempted an armed robbery, but the victim wrestled the gun from the
defendant's hands and fired at him as he fled.68  The bullet, however,
missed the defendant and fatally hit an innocent bystander.69 In reinstating
the murder charge, the Illinois Supreme Court stated:
We reject the court's narrow interpretation of Hickman. Hickman clearly states that
"those who commit forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to
their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape." This court did not state
expressly or impliedly that a robber's expectation of retaliation should be limited to
police officers. Hickman's reliance on Payne, which concerned the retaliation of an
ordinary citizen, is evidence that this court did not intend to limit the use of retaliation
to the conduct of an officer acting in the line of duty.
70
Beyond expressing the broadest application of the felony murder rule in
Illinois to date, Lowery is also significant as the first case where the court
explicitly announced its adherence to the proximate cause theory of felony
murder.71 The Lowery court cited Payne as exemplary of Illinois's first
application of the proximate cause theory and went on to explain why it
adopted the proximate cause approach to felony murder.72 The concept of
proximate causation, explained the court, is derived from tort law and
provided the initial impetus for Illinois courts to adopt the theory into
criminal law.
We believe that the analogies between civil and criminal cases in which individuals
are injured or killed are so close that the principle of proximate cause applies to both
classes of cases. Causal relation is the universal factor common to all legal liability.
In the law of torts, the individual who unlawfully sets in motion a chain of events
which in the natural order of things results in damages to another is held to be
responsible for it.
It is equally consistent with reason and sound public policy to hold that when a
felon's attempt to commit a forcible felony sets in motion a chain of events which
6' 687 N.E.2d 973, 978 (Ill. 1997).
67 Id.
68 Id. at 975.
69 id.
70 Id. at 978.
71 Id.
72 While Payne has been repeatedly cited by the Illinois Supreme Court as the original
proximate cause theory case, the Payne court used principles of accomplice liability to hold
the defendant liable for murder. See infra note 207 for further discussion.
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were or should have been within his contemplation when the motion was initiated, he
should be held responsible for any death which by direct and almost inevitable
sequence results from the initial criminal act.
73
Lowery thus established that foreseeability is a central consideration when
applying the proximate cause theory of felony murder.
In its next major felony murder case, People v. Dekens, the court went
beyond its holding in Lowery and extended liability under the felony
murder rule to co-felon deaths.74 In Dekens, an undercover police officer
arranged to buy drugs from the defendant, but prior to the meeting, the
defendant and an accomplice, unaware of the true identity of their victim,
concocted a plan to rob the undercover officer.75  During the drug
transaction, the defendant pointed a shotgun at the officer who retaliated by
firing several shots. 76 As the officer made his escape, the co-felon grabbed
him, leading the officer to fire at and fatally wound him. 77 The majority
held the defendant liable for his co-felon's death, claiming that its previous
holdings "compel application of the felony-murder doctrine to the
circumstances of [the] case, and stating generally that 'liability should lie
for any death proximately related to the defendant's criminal conduct."'
7 8
The court's broad interpretation of proximate cause theory in Dekens set the
stage for the court's most recent felony murder cases, Klebanowski and
Hudson.
Klebanowski represents the first felony murder case where the
defendant was held liable for the death of his accomplice even though he
was removed from the scene of the crime. The defendant, Robert
Klebanowski, agreed to drive Robert Winters downtown to commit a
robbery.79 Upon seeing a red car pulling out of a garage in an alley,
Winters hopped out of the car armed with a BB gun he had stolen earlier
that day and ran towards the vehicle.80 The defendant remained in his car,
away from the scene of the crime, and bolted as soon as he heard gun
shots.8 1 At trial, testimony revealed that Winters had unwittingly chosen to
rob an off-duty lieutenant from the Chicago Police Department. 82  After
yielding his wallet, the lieutenant chased after Winters and announced
73 Lowery, 687 N.E.2d at 978.




78 Id. at 477.
79 People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d 813, 815 (Ill. 2006).
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 Id. at 816.
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himself as a police officer.83 Winters turned and pointed his BB gun at the
lieutenant prompting the lieutenant to fire multiple shots at Winters,
ultimately killing him.84 Because the defendant admitted in a videotaped
statement that he expected to get some of the proceeds from the robbery for
his role as a getaway driver, the trial court had no difficulty in finding that
he aided and abetted Winters in the commission of the felony.85 And
because Dekens established that a felon can be held accountable for the
death of his accomplice, the court affirmed Klebanowski's first-degree
murder conviction and sentence to twenty years in prison.86
In his appeal, the defendant argued that there was no way for him to
foresee the risk that Winters would be killed during the armed robbery.87
The court quickly dispensed with the defendant's complaint, finding that
Winters' death was "a direct and foreseeable consequence of the armed
robbery. 88 In support of this contention, the court offered simply:
Those who commit forcible felonies know they may encounter resistance, both to
their affirmative actions and to any subsequent escape. It is unimportant that
defendant did not anticipate the precise sequence of events that followed the armed
robbery. We conclude that defendant's unlawful acts precipitated those events, and he
is responsible for the consequences.
8 9
Judge McMorrow, the same judge who would dissent two weeks later
in Hudson, disagreed with the majority's analysis. Not only would she
generally abandon the proximate cause theory in favor of the agency theory
of felony murder, but she also found the proximate cause theory
"particularly inapplicable under the facts of the [Klebanowski] ... case. 9 °
She noted that Klebanowski's participation was limited to providing
transportation to Winters, and this level of participation was too attenuated
to support a finding that his conduct set in motion the chain of events that
led to Winters's death. 91 In effect, McMorrow argued that Winters's own
actions were a superseding intervening cause that rendered Winters's death




8" Id. at 817.
86 id.
87 Id. at 823.
88 id.
89 Id.
90 Id. at 824.
91 Id. at 825.
92 id.
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Judge McMorrow's doubts regarding the proper application of the
proximate cause theory were once again at issue in the court's next case,
People v. Hudson.93 This time, the majority attempted to fully explain its
adherence to the proximate cause theory of the felony murder rule.94
Hudson, a fifteen-year-old boy, accompanied his friend Chrispin Thomas to
rob a barbershop.95 Although they were both armed with handguns,
Hudson's weapon "was inoperable because the trigger had been
removed., 96 Upon entering the barbershop, Thomas waved his gun and
ordered the barbers and patrons to throw their money on the floor while
Hudson stood guard at the entrance.97 By chance, one of the patrons was an
off-duty police officer receiving a haircut, who had his service gun with
him under a barber's smock.98 When Thomas had his back turned, the
officer sprung into action, drew his weapon and announced himself as a
police officer.99 Thomas turned and pointed his gun at the officer who fired
a shot and wounded the robber's upper arm. 100 Undeterred, Thomas
transferred his gun to his other hand, and despite another warning by the
officer, he again raised his gun. 1 The officer responded by firing two
shots which fatally wounded Thomas.10 2  Meanwhile, Hudson was still
picking money up off the floor when the officer turned his attention to him
and ordered him to drop his weapon.'0 3 Instead of complying, Hudson
raised his gun.'0 4 The officer fired at Hudson and the bullet hit his leg.'0 5
Although wounded, Hudson managed to flee from the scene of the crime
and was later apprehended at a nearby hospital." 6 At trial, Hudson was
9' 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1095. (2006).
94 id.










105 Id. Although these were the facts as stated by the appellate court and the supreme
court, the facts seem wholly incredible. It seems improbable that Hudson continued to pick
up money off the floor after his friend had been shot three times. However, even if Hudson
continued to collect the money, it makes no sense that he would raise his triggerless handgun
in order to threaten the officer, and even more implausible that the officer would respond by
shooting him in the leg (as opposed to the shoulder or the arm) in an attempt to disarm the




convicted of first-degree murder for the death of his accomplice under the
felony murder rule and received twenty-two years in prison.0 7
In affirming the appellate court's ruling, the court outlined, for the first
time in its felony murder jurisprudence, the elements of finding proximate
causation: "The term 'proximate cause' describes two distinct requirements:
cause-in-fact and legal cause." 108 Cause-in-fact, also commonly known as
"but-for cause," simply establishes a general causal relationship between
the initial act and the result. 10 9 For example, there is no doubt that the two
teenagers' attempt to rob the barbershop was a but-for cause of Thomas's
death.11° Naturally, had they not gone to rob the barbershop, none of the
tragic events of that day would have transpired. However, because but-for
causation can encompass such a wide range of causal connections, the
further restriction of "legal cause" is required in order to establish liability
under the law. 111 The court explained:
Legal cause is essentially a question of foreseeability; the relevant inquiry is whether
the injury is of a type that a reasonable person would see as a likely result of his or her
conduct. Foreseeability is added to the cause-in-fact requirement because even when
cause in fact is established, it must be determined that any variation between the result
intended and the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair
to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.
1
12
Therefore, the foreseeability inquiry is necessary as a means of ensuring
fairness by establishing the defendant's culpability for the resulting death.
In effect, the "legal cause" requirement supplies the limiting component to
Illinois's felony murder rule restricting its application to only those deaths
that are foreseeable. However, even though the court described the two
essential elements of proximate cause, it failed to address an essential issue
in the proximate cause inquiry: specifically, how foreseeable must the
107 Id. at 1081.
108 Id. at 1083.
109 First Springfield Bank & Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1072 (Ill. 1999).
110 However, it is interesting to note that neither the majority nor the dissent considered
the question of whether Hudson's presence was a but-for cause for Thomas's death. Had
Thomas gone alone, assuming arguendo that he would have gone without an accomplice, it
is quite plausible that the same result would have ensued rendering Hudson not a but-for
cause of his friend's death and thus freeing him from liability.
111 See W. Jonathan Cardi, Reconstructing Foreseeability, 46 B.C. L. REv. 921, 926
(2005) (quoting North v. Johnson, 59 N.W. 1012, 1012 (Minn. 1894) ("[C]ourts recognize
that although consequences of an act go forward to eternity, .. . any attempt to impose
responsibility upon such a basis would result in infinite liability for all wrongful acts, and
would set society on edge and fill courts with endless litigation.")).
112 Hudson, 856 N.E.2d at 1083 (quoting First Springfield Bank & Trust, 720 N.E.2d at
1068).
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manner of death be in order to trigger the felony murder rule?113 Applied
broadly, any resulting death could qualify as "foreseeable," regardless of
how the death occurred, contravening the purpose of proximate cause
theory as a limiting doctrine. In fact, if viewed at its broadest, the
foreseeability requirement would actually be indistinguishable from a
felony murder rule without a proximate cause theory of liability-if simply
engaging in a criminal act is sufficient to establish that a death is
foreseeable, then the entire proximate cause limitation would be rendered
superfluous. 
1 14
The strongest argument for a narrow foreseeability inquiry in
proximate cause felony murder cases is that in tort law, the proximate cause
inquiry is specific. 1 5 In the context of tort law, it has been noted that,
[E]ven where injury of some kind to some person was foreseeable, proximate cause
may fail where the defendant's actions resulted in (1) an unforeseeable type of injury,
(2) injury occurring in an unforeseeable manner, or (3) an injury to an unforeseeable
plaintiff. Furthermore, foreseeability... aids in the decision of whether the actual
consequences of the defendant's conduct were so bizarre or far-removed from the
risks that made the conduct negligent that the defendant, though blameworthy, should
not be liable for them.
116
Because the court has justified its adoption of proximate cause theory based
on its application in tort law, it would not make sense to apply this standard
113 Questions about the subjective nature of proximate cause inquiries and the reasonable
person standard have long pervaded the legal field. Larry Alexander, Insufficient Concern:
A Unified Conception of Criminal Culpability, 88 CALIF. L. REv. 931, 952 (2000) notes that
there is no way to construct the reasonable person nonarbitrarily:
All of us are ignorant of many risks. When is that ignorance the kind that the reasonable person
would possess, when is it not, and why? If negligence were culpable, then we could give an
answer: The reasonable person would not be ignorant of those risks the ignorance of which
would render him culpable. But if ignorance is never culpable because we lack direct control
over it, then we have no materials from which to construct a nonarbitrary "reasonable person."
114 There are many examples of the court applying foreseeability broadly in proximate
cause cases. A good example is the early case People v. Bongiorno, 192 N.E. 856 (Ill.
1934). In Bongiorno, the court affirmed the defendant's first-degree murder conviction
where he had already been arrested by a police officer and his co-conspirator, who had
jumped out of a window to avoid arrest, came back around the building, up the stairs, and
shot the police officer in the back. Even though the defendant was unarmed, the court
inferred the intent to kill merely on the basis of the underlying armed robbery. The use of a
deadly weapon, it reasoned, manifested the intent to kill in order to secure escape, and this
was enough for the court to hold the defendant liable. The court premised liability solely on
the underlying armed robbery felony. It should be noted that although the case was decided
long before proximate cause theory jurisprudence, the court continues to cite Bongiorno as
valid precedent in felony murder cases. Id. at 857.
115 See Cardi, supra note 111, at 926-27.
116 Id. at 926.
2008]
MARTIN LIJTMAER
narrowly in civil litigation but broadly in criminal cases.117 Judge
McMorrow, in her dissent in Klebanowski, noted, "[W]e are not here
considering an issue of tort liability, but an issue of imposing criminal
liability for first-degree murder with the severe consequences that it
entails."' 18 Despite Judge McMorrow's concerns, the court has exhibited a
more generalized approach to foreseeability-the Klebanowski majority
held that "it is unimportant that defendant did not anticipate the precise
sequence of events that followed the armed robbery."'1 19
Further scrutinizing the facts of Hudson and Klebanowski, it appears
that the court applied the foreseeability requirement so broadly as to eclipse
the limiting objective of the proximate cause theory. The court determined
that Hudson should have been able to foresee the death of his friend when
he agreed to participate in the armed robbery of the barber shop.
120
However, the unique facts of the case seem to indicate that Hudson could
not have possibly foreseen the unfolding of events that led to his friend's
death. The fact that an armed, off-duty police officer happened to be
receiving a haircut at the time of the robbery could not possibly have been
considered by the felons. Furthermore, it is doubtful that Hudson could
have anticipated that his friend would have pointed his weapon at a police
officer, and even more unlikely that he could have foreseen his friend's
persistent resistance when he transferred his weapon to his left hand to
point at the officer after he had already been shot, virtually forcing the
police officer to discharge his weapon again. 12  As Judge McMorrow
emphatically points out in her dissent, "It is abundantly clear from
the... facts that Thomas' conduct, not defendant's, 'set in motion' the
chain of events which proximately caused Thomas' death at the hands of
the officer."
1 22
Even more than Hudson, Klebanowski represents an egregious
example of how expansively courts have applied foreseeability
117 See Gerber, supra note 16, at 763-64. Gerber notes that the felony murder rule, in
general, is inconsistent with other criminal and civil standards. He compares two cases, a
wrongful death civil suit and a felony murder case, and concludes that "[o]ur law shows
more care in assessing civil liability than in assessing felony murder despite the far more
serious consequences of the latter." See also Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law
Reconceptualization, 99 HARv. L. REv. 1918, 1918 (1986) (asserting that "the felony murder
rule is constructed out of tort principles and that, at a minimum, fairness considerations
dictate that certain protections traditionally afforded tort defendants ought to be made
equally available to felony murder defendants").
118 People v. Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d 813, 824 (Ill. 2006).
119 Id. at 823 (quoting People v. Smith, 56 Ill. 2d 328, 333-34 (Ill. 1974)).
120 People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1080 (Ill. 2006).
121 Id.
122 Id. at 1095.
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determination under a proximate cause theory of felony murder. Not only
was the defendant sitting in his car around the comer from the crime while
the tragic situation unfolded, but his partner was armed with a BB gun, a
weapon that most reasonable people would not consider lethal.
1 23
Furthermore, as in Hudson, the misfortune of choosing to rob a police
officer could not possibly have been within Klebanowski's contemplation
when he set out with Winters to find an appropriate victim. Also, like
Hudson, the defendant had no control over his friend's decision to point his
weapon at the officer which forced the officer, who legitimately believed
that his assailant had a real weapon, to fire in self-defense. Despite these
facts in both cases, the jury as well as the majority of the judges on the
appellate and supreme courts concluded that both Hudson and Klebanowski
should have been able to foresee the fatal consequences of their actions
prior to attempting to commit their respective robberies.
1 24
Research in cognitive psychology may help account for why the juries
and judges convicted and upheld both defendants' felony murder
convictions. Furthermore, the research can help explain why the court has
grown to apply foreseeability so expansively. As I explain in the next
section, foreseeability inquiries made in hindsight inevitably favor the
prosecution, and blameworthy behavior invites inflated assessments of
causation resulting in an extraordinarily high rate of felony murder
convictions. As such, in establishing its proximate cause felony murder
jurisprudence, the court, by affirming conviction after conviction, naturally
expanded the scope of its proximate cause theory.
III. SURVEY OF PSYCHOLOGICAL RESEARCH FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS
FOR THE PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY OF THE FELONY MURDER RULE
Research in cognitive psychology provides a convincing explanation
for why the proximate cause theory fails in its objective of limiting the
felony murder rule. Psychological phenomena, like the hindsight bias and
outcome bias, as well as theories of causal attribution, suggest that after-
the-fact causal attributions are consistently overestimated, undermining the
prophylactic effect of the proximate cause theory 1 25 While legal scholars
123 Klebanowski, 852 N.E.2d at 815.
124 Id.
125 Dripps, supra note 20, at 1405. I am partially indebted to Professor Dripps for
spawning the idea for this Comment. In his article, Dripps focuses on the fundamental
attribution error ("FAE")-the tendency of people to attribute behavior and its consequences
to an actor's personality rather than to the situation-and analyzes its implications for the
theoretical justifications for punishment. He argues that the FAE may mean that retributive
theory in practice will inflict punishment out of proportion to a rational measurement of "just
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have analyzed the effect of these biases to proximate cause inquiries in tort
litigation, 126  scholarly work examining the implications of these
psychological phenomena to the felony murder rule is still in its infancy.
127
A. THE HINDSIGHT BIAS
The hindsight bias refers to the phenomenon that people overestimate
the predictability of past events. 12 8  Colloquially, the hindsight bias is
familiarly referred to as "Monday morning quarterbacking," and is aptly
captured in the popular expression that "hindsight is 20/20.29 Virtually
every study on the hindsight bias has confirmed its existence 130 and
indicates that its effect is "remarkably robust."'' 3 1  Convincing
demonstrations of hindsight bias are well established experimentally and
the phenomenon has been the subject of extensive reviews. 132 It is also
remarkably persistent-unlike many biases, it has been shown to be highly
resistant to debiasing techniques, making it difficult to avoid. 133 Therefore,
deserts." Legislators, judges, and juries following intuitive notions of blameworthiness will
tend to overassess individual responsibility and underassess situational factors.
In reference to the proximate cause theory, Dripps notes:
Absent such a limit, the lottery-like character of strict liability doctrines such as felony murder
becomes more pronounced. FAE, together with the hindsight bias, however, suggests that
proximate cause-notoriously difficult to define more precisely than as an appeal to intuition-
will tend to be applied expansively rather than restrictively.
Id.
126 See, e.g., Justin D. Levinson & Kaiping Peng, Different Torts for Different Cohorts: A
Cultural Psychological Critique of Tort Law's Actual Cause and Foreseeability Inquiries, 13
S. CAL INTERDIS. L.J. 195 (2004); John E. Montgomery, Cognitive Biases and Heuristics in
Tort Litigation: A Proposal to Limit Their Effects Without Changing the World, 85 NEB. L.
REv. 15 (2006); Peters, supra note 10.
127 See generally Dripps, supra note 20. Although Professor Dripps deals primarily with
broad theoretical questions, he briefly touches upon the felony murder rule and discusses the
FAE and its role in proximate cause determinations. He suggests that the FAE compels
people to blame the felony murder defendant because it causes people to attribute behavior
to personality at the expense of considering situational factors. Id at 1405.
128 Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 571.
129 Id. at 580.
130 Id
131 Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Regulating in Foresight Versus Judging Liability in Hindsight:
The Case of Tobacco, 33 GA. L. REv. 813, 823 (1999).
132 See K. Henriksen & H. Kaplan, Hindsight Bias, Outcome Knowledge and Adaptive
Learning, 12 QUAL. SAFE HEALTH CARE 46, 46 (2006) (noting that "[r]obust reports of
[hindsight bias] come from a variety of domains including medical diagnoses, legal rulings,
financial forecasts, election returns, business outcomes, sporting events, and military
campaigns").
133 See Kim A. Kamin & Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Ex Post j Ex Ante: Determining Liability
in Hindsight, 19 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 89, 92 (1995) ("[T]he hindsight bias has proven
resistant to most debiasing techniques. Attempts to undo the hindsight effect with strategies
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even when people are warned of its existence and its effect, they are usually
still susceptible to it.' 34 Overall, studies in the hindsight bias have led one
expert to conclude that "[t]he overwhelming verdict.., is that the hindsight
bias is a robust phenomenon that is not easily eliminated or even
moderated. Across a wide variety of tasks and materials, a sizeable and
consistent bias clouds judgments made in hindsight."'
35
The primary theoretical explanation of the hindsight bias is referred to
as the cognitive theory. 136 The cognitive theory posits that when people
know an outcome, they naturally integrate the events leading to that
outcome into a coherent story. 137  In the process of constructing this
narrative, people mentally emphasize certain circumstances that support the
development of the known outcome while downplaying other
circumstances that would have led to alternative plausible outcomes. 38 To
better illustrate the unfolding of these mental processes, it is instructive to
review one of the seminal studies in hindsight bias as an example-the
Fischhoff experiment.
In the Fischhoff experiment, researchers presented subjects with a
short narrative describing the circumstances leading up to a war between
the British and the Nepalese Gurkhas in the early nineteenth century.
40
After being presented with these facts, the subjects were given the choice
between four possible outcomes: "British victory, Gurkha victory, stalemate
with no peace settlement, or stalemate with a peace settlement.'' 1  The
researchers divided the subjects into five different groups. 42 In each of the
that rely on motivation, such as suggesting to people that they try harder, increasing personal
relevance of the task, and rewarding people for unbiased responses, have proven ineffective.
Furthermore, alerting people to the bias' influence does not mitigate the effect.") (internal
citations omitted).
134 While most researchers, like Rachlinski, maintain tlhat the bias is extremely resilient,
some scholars point out that there is research that shows that with comprehensive efforts in
debiasing the effects of the hindsight bias can be reduced. See Peters, supra note 10, at
1289:
[M]ost of the studies indicate that forcing subjects to think concretely about all possible
outcomes reduces the hindsight bias markedly .... Although more research will be needed to
ascertain precisely how actively the subject must participate in the debiasing exercise in order to
reduce the bias, the current findings justify cautious optimism about the debiasing potential of
strategies that actively engage the subject in a foresight exercise.
135 Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 580-81.
136 Id. at 582.
131 Id. at 584.
138 Id.






first four groups, one of the outcomes was communicated to the subjects,
after which they were asked to assign a probability of that outcome in
retrospect. 143 In the final group, no outcome was disclosed and the subjects
were simply asked to rate the probability of each possible outcome. 144 The
study showed that those who were asked to determine the probability in
hindsight exaggerated the foreseeability of the result. 145  Judging in
hindsight was found to increase people's estimates of the actual outcome by
between 6 and 44%. 146 The study also provided support for the cognitive
theory explanation for the hindsight bias:
[S]ubjects told that the British had won rated the British advantages (better weapons
and training) as more relevant to the outcome than the Nepalese advantages (better
motivation and familiarity with the terrain). These subjects probably also concluded
that training and weapons are more important to a military victory under these
circumstances than motivation and familiarity with the terrain, and perhaps are more
significant in warfare generally.
14 7
Thus, by emphasizing the circumstances that would clearly lead to the
given outcome, people may view the outcome as inevitable.
148
Hindsight bias studies have also been conducted with regards to tort
law specifically addressing the question of foreseeability. Inspired by the
well known case Tarasoff v. Regents of University of California,
149
cognitive psychologists Susan and Larry LaBine set out to study the effects
of the hindsight in determining liability for psychiatrists for violence
committed by their patients. 50  The experiment was modeled after the





14" Id. at 585.
148 Fischhoff, the author of this pioneering study, concluded:
In hindsight, people consistently exaggerate what could have been anticipated in foresight. They
not only tend to view what has happened as having been inevitable but also to view it as having
appeared "relatively inevitable" before it happened. People believe that others should have been
able to anticipate events much better than was actually the case.
Id. at 572.
"' 551 P.2d 334 (Cal. 1976). In Tarasoff, the plaintiff sued therapists and police for
failure to warn the victim where the patient had expressed the intention to kill her. Although
the lower courts granted a motion to dismiss, the court reversed the decision against the
therapists. The court held that the therapists' special relationship to the patient was extended
to the victim, and they had a duty to use reasonable care in warning the victim of the
possible danger. Id. at 343.
150 Susan J. LaBine & Gary LaBine, Determinations of Negligence and the Hindsight
Bias, 20 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 501 (1996).
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involved psychiatrists' treatment of potentially violent patients.' 51 Those
who were told that a patient became violent judged the patient's violence as
significantly more foreseeable than those that were not provided with an
outcome.152 Furthermore, subjects aware of the violent outcome judged the
therapist negligent 24% of the time, while those that were told that no
violence resulted, or were given no outcome, judged the therapist negligent
6% and 9% negligent, respectively.1 53 The researchers thus reaffirmed the
power of the hindsight bias in assessing foreseeability.1
54
B. THE OUTCOME BIAS
The outcome bias refers to the tendency to judge the quality of a
decision, good or bad, based on its consequences.1 55 Although such
determinations are a natural process of how we learn from past mistakes, a
good decision does not necessarily guarantee a good outcome. It has been
noted by a prominent social psychologist that "all real decisions are made
under uncertainty. A decision is therefore a bet, and evaluating it as good
or not must depend on the stakes and the odds, not on the outcome."'
56
Psychologists emphasize that the outcome bias is distinct and independent
from the hindsight bias, even though, as will be discussed infra, the two
work in tandem, seriously complicating the task of making after-the-fact
foreseeability judgments. 57 To be clear, whereas the hindsight bias makes
people over-predict the foreseeability of past events, the outcome bias leads
people to judge the quality of past decisions based on the results of those
decisions.
In one of the major studies on the outcome bias, cognitive
psychologists Jonathon Baron and John Hershey found the existence of the
bias consistently across five experiments. 58 In their first experiment, for
151 id.
152 Id. at 502.
153 Id. at 510.
154 Id. The researchers, quoting C.W. Williams, P.R. Less-Haley & R.S. Brown, Human
Response to Traumatic Events: An Integration of Counterfactual Thinking, Hindsight Bias,
and Attribution Theory, 72 PSYCHOL. REP. 483, 488 (1993), noted:
[I]t is natural for people to ponder questions such as "what might have been..." and "if
only..." following a traumatic event .... [T]he easier it is for observers to imagine alternative
outcomes to a tragic event, the easier it is to construe that the target could have and should have
done more about preventing the tragedy, and the more the target will be blamed for the outcome.
155 Peters, supra note 10, at 1282.
156 Ward Edwards, How to Make Good Decisions, in "What Constitutes a Good
Decision? ", 56 ACTA PSYCHOLOGICA 5, 7 (1984).
157 Peters, supra note 10, at 1282.
158 Jonathan Baron & John C. Hershey, Outcome Bias in Decision Evaluation, 54 J.
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 569, 570 (1988).
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example, they provided subjects with a scenario of a fifty-five-year-old man
suffering from a heart condition.159 Even though he could live with the
condition, a bypass procedure was available which would both relieve his
pain as well as increase his life expectancy.160  The operation, however,
presented a risk; there was an 8% chance that the operation would fail
resulting in death.1 61 Equipped with this knowledge, subjects were asked to
evaluate a surgeon's decision to go ahead with the operation.' 62 When told
that the surgery was a success, subjects rated the decision significantly
more favorably than those who were told that it failed. 163  Baron and
Hershey found similar support for the presence of the outcome bias in the
subsequent four experiments. 
164
Not only does the outcome bias cause people to judge decisions
negatively based on adverse outcomes, but further research suggests that it
is amplified as the severity of the injury increases. 65 In another study,
anesthesiologists were asked to judge the quality of care received in twenty-
one cases where a patient suffered negative consequences due to the
improper administration of anesthesia. 66 The researchers varied the injury
so that in some cases the damage was permanent, while in others it was
only temporary. 67 The researchers found that the ratings for appropriate
care decreased by thirty-one percentage points when the outcome was
changed from temporary to permanent and increased by twenty-eight
percentage points when the outcome was changed from permanent to
temporary, indicating that the severity of harm had a magnifying effect on
the outcome bias.
168
C. RESEARCH IN CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
Particularly significant for this examination of proximate cause and the
felony murder rule is Mark Alicke's study on "Culpable Causation," which
he defines as "the influence of the perceived blameworthiness of an action
"' Id. at 571.
160 Id.
161 Id.
162 Id. at 572.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Robert A. Caplan et al., Effect of Outcome on Physician Judgments of
Appropriateness of Care, 265 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 1957, 1960 (1991); see also Peters, supra
note 10, at 1283 ("Outcome bias appears to be most serious when the victim's injuries are
severe. Although the research findings have been inconsistent, most conclude that severity
is associated with a greater assessment of fault.").
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on judgments of its causal impact on a harmful outcome."16 9  Alicke
recognizes the complexity of causal determinations, especially in cases
where multiple causal factors force the observer to portion out such factors
among possible candidates, and assess the relative influence of each. 70 In
making causal determinations where a negative result ensues, Alicke
ascribes to the "stain criterion.' 71 This theory posits that people will over-
attribute blame to a culpable party to emphasize her wrongdoing. 172  He
hypothesizes, "[W]hen asked to identify which of a number of competing
causal factors is the primary cause of a harmful event, people will cite the
cause for which an actor is most blameworthy."'173 In a series of four
studies, Alicke confirmed his prediction. The first of these studies is
illustrative.
Subjects were presented with a scenario where a man, John, was
speeding in a rush to get home and got into an accident with another
automobile as he crossed an intersection. 174 As a result, the other driver
sustained multiple lacerations, a broken collar bone, and a fractured ar175
John, however, walked away from the accident unscathed. 176 Within this
scenario, Alicke manipulated several variables in order to study how
subjects attributed blame when confronted with multiple necessary and
sufficient causes. 177 There were three variations that each included an
additional factor: (1) an oil spill that hindered John's ability to stop when he
applied the brakes, (2) a tree branch which hindered John's ability to see a
stop sign at the intersection, and (3) the running of the stop sign by the
other driver and John's inability to slow down in time to avoid the other
car. 178 Also, in order to introduce the blameworthy element to his test,
Alicke manipulated the reasons why John was rushing home. 179 In the
"socially desirable motive" version, he was rushing home to hide an
anniversary present from his parents that he had left out in the open. 180 Inthe "socially undesirable motive" version, John was racing home to hide a
169 Alicke, supra note 13, at 368.
170 Id.
'7 Id. (citing JOEL FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVING: ESSAYS IN THE THEORY OF
RESPONSIBILITY (1970)).
172 id.










vial of cocaine from his parents. 181  As predicted, John's motive for
speeding played a pivotal role in subjects' determination of causal
attribution. 182 John was cited more frequently as a cause of the accident
when he was rushing to hide the vial of cocaine than when he was speeding
home to hide the anniversary present. 83 Furthermore, when rated on a
scale from one to ten, John was considered more responsible for the
accident and his actions more causally related to the accident in the
"socially undesirable" version, regardless of which scenario the subjects
were exposed to.184 The results of this experiment, along with the other
three experiments conducted in the study, led Alicke to conclude that the
degree of culpability in an act influences perceptions of causation. 
185
Much like the outcome bias, causal attributions are subject to
magnification when the severity of harm increases. In a pioneering study
on causation and the attribution of responsibility, researchers studied the
relationship between the severity of negative consequences of blameworthy
behavior and attribution of responsibility for that behavior. 186  Subjects
were given a condensed description of a jury trial regarding a bank
robbery. 187 In the course of the robbery, a bank teller, in trying to trigger an
alarm, disobeyed the robber's order not to move, prompting the robber to
fire at him or her.1 88 The bullet, however, missed the teller and ricocheted
off the wall, hitting another customer. 189 The primary variable manipulated
in the study was the extent of the resulting harm to the victim. 190 In the
mild scenario, the customer merely suffered a superficial flesh wound,
whereas in the severe scenario, the bullet severed the customer's spine
causing permanent paralysis from the neck down.191 The researchers then
surveyed the subjects' attributions of responsibility for the robber who fired
the bullet, as well as for the teller, who moved against the robber's
orders.1 92 The results indicated a greater degree of responsibility attribution
as the severity of harm to the victim increased for both the robber and the
181 Id.




186 Ugwuegbu & Hendrick, supra note 15.
187 Id. at 77.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 79.
190 Id. The researchers also manipulated the gender of the perpetrator and the victim, and
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teller.1 93 While, as common sense would dictate, the robber was assigned a
significantly higher degree of responsibility in both scenarios, it is revealing
that the teller's responsibility was also amplified when paralysis resulted.
194
Furthermore, when asked to evaluate a level of punishment for the robber
and teller, subjects recommended more punishment as the severity of the
resulting harm increased. 195 Thus, the subjects recommended, on average,
prison time of one to five years for the robber in the mild scenario, whereas
they recommended five to ten years' prison time when paralysis resulted.
196
Furthermore, while subjects generally proposed no punishment for the teller
in the mild scenario, most recommended a loss of raise as punishment in the
severe scenario.
1 97
Research in causal attribution, therefore, provides two conclusions
relevant to this paper's inquiry. First, blameworthy behavior causes
observing third parties to make unwarranted causal connections when
evaluating responsibility. And second, these unwarranted connections are
magnified when the resulting harm is greater.
D. CASE-SPECIFIC IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH IN COGNITIVE
PSYCHOLOGY ON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY OF THE
FELONY MURDER RULE
The implications of hindsight bias research to the foreseeability
requirement of proximate cause theory, as applied to specific cases, are
straightforward. Juries are asked to determine whether the defendant
should have foreseen the consequences of his conduct, but the research on
hindsight bias suggests that these after-the-fact determinations are
inherently skewed. Because the hindsight bias makes outcomes seem more
predictable in hindsight than they were in foresight, juries are more likely to
conclude that a death occurring during the course of a felony was
foreseeable. While in some cases such a result might be warranted, in
others, such as Hudson and Klebanowski, such assessments might be over-
exaggerated.
As discussed, the cognitive theory underlying hindsight bias suggests
that people, when given information about bad outcomes, likely "rewrite
the story" so that the beginning and middle provide a causal explanation for
what they know to be the end result.' 98 Thus, juries attempting to make
'9' Id. at 81.
,94 Id. at 84.
'9' Id. at 83.
196 id.
197 id.
198 See Peters, supra note 10, at 1286.
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foreseeability determinations in felony murder cases will tend to highlight
particular facts that would seem to make the resulting death inevitable while
downplaying those that would result in an alternative outcome. The jurors
in Hudson, for example, may have mentally highlighted the fact that
Hudson was clearly aware that his friend was armed with a lethal weapon,
but they may have downplayed the significance of the coincidence that an
off-duty police officer happened to be getting a haircut when the two boys
went to rob the store, and that he had his service revolver with him while he
was getting his hair cut. Similarly, in Klebanowski, juries may have
mentally emphasized Klebanowski's role in the crime as the getaway
driver, yet diminished the role the police officer played in Winters' death
and minimized the significance of the fact that Winters was armed with a
non-lethal BB gun as opposed to a firearm. In this way, the jury may have
assessed the foreseeability of Winters' death as more plausible.
It is also important to stress that trial judges and appellate court judges
are equally affected by the bias, 199 suggesting that they too will
overestimate the foreseeability of the resulting deaths in felony murder
cases. Furthermore, because judges are required to defer to jury
determinations, they are unlikely to disturb an initial decision against a
defendant.
When combining hindsight bias effects with the outcome bias,
foreseeability determinations in felony murder cases are further
prejudiced.200  Because the outcome bias distorts past judgments by
associating bad outcomes with bad decisions, juries are likely to judge the
defendant harshly for participating in the felonious enterprise. 0 1 In
addition, because the outcome bias is amplified in cases where the resulting
harm is severe, juries considering felony murder cases will likely be
susceptible to an extreme manifestation of the bias.20 2 As such, outcome
bias research suggests that the felony murder defendant will be considered
more blameworthy than he would have been had no death resulted, even in
199 Rachlinski, supra note 9, at 579-80 (explaining that "[t]he [hindsight] bias is not
limited to specific populations of subjects. .. . Studies even have demonstrated that the bias
influences the judgments of experts in several different fields. Two studies have shown that
even state and federal judges are susceptible to the bias").
200 See Peters, supra note 10, at 1283 (noting that "[i]n real life, the two biases can work
together").
201 id.
202 Because the research strongly suggests a correlation between severity of harm and
intensity of the outcome bias, one would assume that death, being the most severe of harms,
would yield the greatest outcome bias effect. This assertion, however, to my knowledge, has
yet to be tested, which is why I propose further study of this phenomenon in my conclusion.
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cases such as Hudson and Klebanowski, where the deaths appeared to be
completely disconnected from the defendants' acts.20 3
The research specifically addressing causation, much like the hindsight
and outcome biases, also has significant ramifications for jury
determinations assessing the proximate cause theory of felony murder. The
Alicke study demonstrates that people will include the blameworthiness of
a person's actions in their calculus in making causal attributions.0 4
Therefore, the mere fact that the felony murder defendant was engaged in
felonious conduct will tend to lead juries to connect a defendant's actions to
the resulting death. Ugwuegbu and Hendrick's study further adds that
when blameworthy behavior results in severe injury, even greater
responsibility tends to be attributed to the actor.20 5 Working in tandem,
these two studies in causal attribution suggest that the playing field is
heavily tilted against the felony murder defendant. Much like John
speeding home to hide his vial of cocaine, the felony murder defendant will
generally be causally connected to the resulting death, and, because of the
severity of the result, this causal connection will be amplified, further
skewing proximate cause determinations against the defendant.
E. BROAD IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH IN COGNITIVE PSYCHOLOGY
ON THE PROXIMATE CAUSE THEORY OF THE FELONY MURDER
RULE
On a broad level, research in cognitive psychology can help explain
why the proximate cause theory was instituted in the first place and why it
is has grown to be applied so expansively. The Illinois Legislature
employed unconstrained language when drafting its felony murder rule in
1961 by considering the felony murder rule in the abstract and by premising
its decision on the facts of People v. Payne,20 6 a case that has been labeled
the original proximate cause-felony murder case in Illinois. After this
recodification, the court gradually expanded the scope of the felony murder
203 It is important to note that at least one scholar has cautioned against reform that
would offset the effects of hindsight and outcome biases in tort litigation. See Peters, supra
note 10, at 1278. However, his concerns, though legitimate with respect to civil suits, are
mostly inapplicable in criminal cases. For example, he suggests that pro-defendant
sympathies generated by doubting the motives of the plaintiff in tort suits, especially
malpractice suits, help to offset the advantages conferred to the plaintiff by the presence of
the biases. Id. at 1296. Clearly, such sympathies would not be present in a felony murder
case where the opposing party is the state. Peters also points out that there are cognitive
biases favoring defendants and that "underclaiming" is prevalent in tort law-both facts
which do not translate into the criminal law field and felony murder cases. Id. at 1297.
204 See generally Alicke, supra note 13.
205 See generally Ugwuegbu & Hendrick, supra note 15.
206 194 N.E. 539 (Ill. 1935).
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rule and the proximate cause theory by affirming convictions case by case
across a wide range of scenarios. This expansion eventually culminated in
the two recent cases, Hudson and Klebanowski.
Critical to understanding why the legislature chose such broad
language in its recodification of the rule in 1961 is the fact that Payne, more
so than some of the modem cases, may actually lend itself to a
foreseeability analysis in which the defendant could be held accountable for
the resulting death.2 °7 In Payne, armed robbers engaged in a shootout with
two brothers that resulted in one of their deaths.2 °8 Three men, all armed,
approached the brothers' home in the early evening, two from the front and
one from the rear.20 9 One of the brothers went out to the porch where he
was confronted by one of the men who pointed a revolver at him, which
prompted him to scream.21 0 According to the surviving brother's testimony,
upon hearing the scream, he went towards the door armed with a revolver
but heard gun shots before he could intervene. 21  These initial gunshots
started the gunfight that resulted in the fatality.21 2 Because it could not be
determined who fired the fatal shots, one of the primary questions
confronting the court was whether it mattered that the actual perpetrator
was unknown for the purposes of the felony murder rule.213 The court
affirmed the defendant's conviction for murder, finding that "it reasonably
might be anticipated that an attempted robbery would meet with resistance,
during which the victim might be shot either by himself or someone else in
attempting to prevent the robbery, and those attempting to perpetrate the
robbery would be guilty of murder., 214  This holding, the first
207 It is important to note that Payne, despite its being dubbed as the first proximate cause
theory case in Illinois, never discusses "proximate cause" in its analysis and was in fact
partially premised on complicity theory. The defendant conspired with the armed robbers
but was actually not present at the scene of the crime. Accomplice liability, also known as
the law of complicity, imputes a co-felon with the criminal acts of the principal actor. Thus
once it was established that the defendant aided and abetted the armed robbers, he was held
responsible for the consequences of their actions. However, the proximate cause element of
the case, as discussed above, is whether it mattered who fired the fatal shot in determining
whether the felony murder rule ought to apply. In fact, in Lowery, where the court explicitly
adopted the proximate cause theory, the court did not mention that the defendant was not
present at the time of the killing when labeling Payne as "exemplary of Illinois' first
application of the proximate cause theory." People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 976 (Ill.
1997).





213 Id. at 543.
214 id.
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announcement of the proximate cause theory of felony murder, stemmed
directly from the particular facts of the case. Thus, while psychological
phenomena probably also contributed to Payne's conviction, it is significant
that Payne was the one who hatched the plan to rob the brothers, and that it
was the assailants who fired the initial shots that led to the gun battle
resulting in the homicide. Therefore, when the legislature reconsidered the
felony murder rule in drafting the 1961 criminal code and used Payne as the
basis for its recodification, it is understandable that the legislature would
opt for expansive language. Causal attribution research suggests that in
thinking about felony murder cases in the abstract, especially with Payne as
a backdrop, the committee justified its broad language because it was led to
believe that, generally speaking, felons are naturally culpable and causally
connected to any resulting deaths.
"Giving effect" to the legislature's intent as evinced in the statute's
broad language, the court continued to broaden the application of the
proximate cause theory on a case-by-case basis. Recapping the major
felony murder cases since the 1961 recodification starting with Allen and
Hickman, the court extended liability to felons for the death of police
officers acting in the line of duty, even if shot by a fellow officer.21 5 In
People v. Lowery, the case in which the court explicitly announced its
adherence to the proximate cause theory, liability was extended to felons for
all third-party deaths.216 Finally, Dekens established that felons could even
be held responsible for the deaths of co-felons at the hands of a victim.
217
The two most recent cases, Hudson and Klebanowski, affirmed the ruling in
Dekens that felons could be held liable for the deaths of their accomplices,
but on fact patterns that seem to undermine the purported limiting purpose
of the proximate cause requirement completely. To reiterate the majority in
Hudson,
Foreseeability is added to the cause-in-fact requirement because even when cause in
fact is established, it must be determined that any variation between the result
intended and the result actually achieved is not so extraordinary that it would be unfair
to hold the defendant responsible for the actual result.
2 18
However, as discussed above, the court applies proximate cause more
generally in Hudson and Klebanowski than it does in tort suits. Thus, by so
broadening the scope of the proximate cause inquiry, the court undermines
the very limitation that it claims to endorse.
215 People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 511, 513 (Ill. 1974); People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d
544, 549 (Ill. 1974).
216 People v. Lowery, 687 N.E.2d 973, 975-76 (Ill. 1997).
217 People v. Dekens, 695 N.E.2d 474, 475 (Ill. 1998).
218 People v. Hudson, 856 N.E.2d 1078, 1083 (I11. 2006) (quoting First Springfield Bank
& Trust v. Galman, 720 N.E.2d 1068, 1083 (Ill. 1999)).
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In conclusion, research in cognitive psychology suggests proximate
cause determinations are bound to be skewed against defendants in
individual cases, leading to a high degree of probability that felony murder
defendants will be convicted of murder. These convictions are almost
always affirmed because appellate judges are equally susceptible to the
various biases and are they are required to be deferential to jury
determinations. The combined effect of these affirmations has led to an
ever-expanding felony murder rule jurisprudence culminating in cases like
Hudson and Klebanowski, where the foreseeability inquiry seems to have
been subsumed by the defendants' mere participation in the underlying
felony.
IV. PROPOSED FUTURE STUDY AND CONCLUSION
More research may be required to give full effect to each of the claims
laid out in this Comment. However, arranging a study that would test these
assertions would not be difficult. In fact, the two cases which inspired this
comment, Hudson and Klebanowski, would provide the ideal starting point
for a study. Using the facts of each case, one can easily emulate the
Fischhoff Experiment to test whether the hindsight bias's effect extends to
juries and felony murder cases. Furthermore, one could directly test
people's causal attributions by relying on the same fact patterns and
manipulating variables that might make the defendant more and less
blameworthy to test whether, in fact, people do use blameworthiness as a
gauge for causation in felony murder scenarios. It may be more difficult to
test the broader implications of cognitive psychology, but it might be
revealing to present subjects with a handful of fact patterns from Illinois
felony murder cases such as Payne, Lowery, Hickman, Dekens,
Klebanowski, and Hudson, then have them rate the culpability of the
defendant in each. The resulting ratings may reveal how laypeople would
judge whether or not the felony murder rule is expanding. Thus, if the
defendants in Klebanowski and Hudson are judged the least culpable while
the defendants in Payne and Hickman are judged the most culpable, it
would lend credence to the assertion that the felony murder rule has
expanded since the proximate cause theory's inception. Furthermore,
subjects could indicate whether they believed the death was foreseeable as
well as the kind of punishment they believed would be warranted in each
situation to help judge how community sentiment stacks against the
legislature's mandate that felony murder is first-degree murder.
Illinois's adherence to the proximate cause theory of the felony murder
rule has recently led to some anomalous results holding defendants liable
for first-degree murder for deaths that they neither intended, nor could have
foreseen happening. This Comment contributes to the long scholarly
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tradition of critiquing the felony murder rule by focusing on the proximate
cause theory and looking at the theory through the lens of cognitive
psychology. The hindsight and outcome biases both reveal an inherent
infirmity in foreseeability inquiries-people are bound to believe that a
result was inevitable and thus conclude that a specific outcome was more
foreseeable in hindsight than it actually was in foresight. Furthermore,
research in causal attribution shows that people are likely to consider the
morality of a person's actions when determining causality, even though the
two are completely independent factors. Thus, the felony murder
defendant, who was inevitably engaged in morally blameworthy behavior in
participating in a felony, will be causally linked to a resulting death even if
his participation in the felony did not directly lead to that death.
On a broader level, these psychological phenomena may have induced
the Illinois legislature to adopt a broad felony murder statute in its 1961
revision of the criminal code which, in turn, has given tremendous leeway
in interpreting the statute. Due to the influence of cognitive psychology on
each individual case, felony murder defendants inevitably lose, and the
court keeps announcing broader and broader standards for the interpretation
of the 1961 felony murder statute. It has been precisely this expansion that
led the court to decide Hudson and Klebanowski the way it did. Both cases
represent the failure of the proximate cause theory as a limiting doctrine on
the felony murder rule. Instead, the foreseeability requirement seems to
have grown to be applied disingenuously, rendering any participation in a
felony sufficient basis for justifying holding a defendant accountable for a
death. As a result, whereas the proximate cause theory is supposed to
temper the innate harshness of the felony murder rule, in practice it is
applied so expansively as to eliminate its limiting purpose.
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